











































The attached material is posted on regulation2point0.org with permission.  
JOINT CENTER
AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REGULATORY STUDIES 
 
 
Regulating Emissions of Greenhouse Gases Under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act 
 
 
William J. Baumol, Robert W. Crandall,  
Robert W. Hahn, Paul L. Joskow,  
Robert E. Litan, and Richard L. Schmalensee 
 
Brief 06-01 
October 2006  No.  05-1120 
In the Supreme Court of the United States 
    
    
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL., 
Respondents. 
    
    
On Writ of Certiorari to  
the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit 
   
   
BRIEF OF WILLIAM J. BAUMOL,  
ROBERT W. CRANDALL, ROBERT W. HAHN,  
PAUL L. JOSKOW, ROBERT E. LITAN, AND  
RICHARD L. SCHMALENSEE AS AMICI CURIAE  
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS 
    
    
ERIKA Z. JONES 
ADAM C. SLOANE 
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & 
  Maw LLP 
  1909 K Street, N.W. 
  Washington, DC 20006 
 (202)  263-3000 
TIMOTHY S. BISHOP 
Counsel of Record 
RUSSELL R. EGGERT 
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & 
Maw LLP 
71 South Wacker Dr. 
Chicago, IL 60606 
(312) 782-0600 
Counsel for Amici Curiae i 
 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Amici will address the following question: 
Whether the Environmental Protection Agency’s denial 
of the petition to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases 
from motor vehicles under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air 
Act was reasonable in light of the global nature of green-
house gas emissions and the likely superiority of other meth-
ods for combating greenhouse gases. ii 
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INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE
1 
Amici are economics professors and scholars who have 
expertise and  write and teach on public policy, regulatory 
economics, and the economics of environmental policy. 
                                                                                                                             
1  All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Pursuant to 
this Court’s Rule 37.6, amici state that no counsel for any party in 
this case authored this brief in whole or in part. The following non-
parties made monetary contributions for the preparation and sub-
mission of this brief: Arizona Automobile Dealers Association; 
Automobile Dealers Association of Alabama; Automobile Dealers 
Association of Greater Philadelphia; California Motor Car Dealers 
Association; Chicago Automobile Trade Association; Colorado 
Automobile Dealers Association; Detroit Auto Dealers Associa-
tion; Eastern New York Coalition of Automotive Retailers, Inc.; 
Florida Automobile Dealers Association; Georgia Automobile 
Dealers Association; Greater Cleveland Automobile Dealers’ As-
sociation; Illinois Automobile Dealers Association; Iowa Automo-
bile Dealers Association; Kansas Automobile Dealers Association; 
Kentucky Automobile Dealers Association; Maine Automobile 
Dealers Association, Inc; Maryland Automobile Dealers Associa-
tion; Massachusetts State Auto Dealers Association, Inc.; Metro 
Denver Automobile Dealers Association; Metro Portland New Car 
Dealers Association; Michigan Automobile Dealers Association; 
Missouri Automobile Dealers Association; New Hampshire Auto-
mobile Dealers Association; New Jersey Coalition of Automotive 
Retailers; New Mexico Automotive Dealers Association, New 
York State Automobile Dealers Association; Niagara Frontier 
Automobile Dealers Association; North Carolina Automobile 
Dealers Association; Ohio Automobile Dealers Association; Okla-
homa Automobile Dealers Association; Oregon Automobile Deal-
ers Association; Pennsylvania Automotive Association; Rochester 
Automobile Dealers’ Association, Inc.; Silicon Valley Auto Deal-
ers Association; South Carolina Automobile Dealers Association; 
Tennessee Automotive Association; Texas Automobile Dealers 
Association; Utah Automobile Dealers Association; Vermont 
Automobile Dealers Association; Virginia Automobile Dealers 
Association; Washington Area New Automobile Dealers Associa-





Amici are  
•  William J. Baumol 
Professor of Entrepreneurship and Academic Director 
of the Berkeley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies, 
New York University, and Senior Economist and  
Professor Emeritus, Princeton University; 
•  Robert W. Crandall  
Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, and Senior  
Fellow, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies; 
•  Robert W. Hahn  
Executive Director, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for 
Regulatory Studies, and Resident Scholar, American 
Enterprise Institute;  
•  Paul L. Joskow 
Professor of Economics and Management,  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Director, 
Center for Energy and Environmental Policy  
Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; 
•  Robert E. Litan  
Director, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies, and Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution;  
•  Richard L. Schmalensee 
Dean, Alfred P. Sloan School of Management,  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Professor 
of Economics and Management, Massachusetts  
Institute of Technology. 
Amici file solely as individuals and not on behalf of any 
institutions with which they are affiliated.   
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Climate change poses serious environmental, social, and 
economic issues that should not be neglected. The urgency of 
these issues, however, should not obscure the fact that there 
are better and worse policy instruments for responding to this 





This case arises from the D.C. Circuit’s denial of a peti-
tion for review that challenged the refusal by the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to engage 
in rulemaking to regulate “Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
New Motor Vehicles Under § 202 of the Clean Air Act.” Pe-
tition for Rulemaking at JA 5.
2 Section 202 directs the Ad-
ministrator to prescribe “by regulation * * * standards appli-
cable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or 
classes of new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engines, 
which, in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution 
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). EPA denied the 
petition, based in part on its determination that, having regard 
to “public health or welfare,” “setting [greenhouse gas] emis-
sion standards is not appropriate at this time.” Pet. App. A67. 
The D.C. Circuit, in a lead opinion by Judge Randolph, held 
that, in weighing “‘policy’ considerations” relevant to the 
public health and welfare to deny the petition, the “EPA Ad-
ministrator properly exercised his discretion under 
§ 202(a)(1).” Pet. App. A14, A15.  
The rulemaking petition sought the regulation of GHGs 
under Section 202(a) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), 
rather than just a determination that carbon dioxide, methane, 
nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons are air pollutants 
within the meaning of Section 302(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).  
See JA 5, 6-7, 15, 16, 21-44. The court of appeals recognized 
that the petition for rulemaking sought regulation of GHGs. 
See Pet. App. A11 (“Petitioners sought to have EPA regulate, 
under § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, carbon dioxide (CO2) 
and three other greenhouse gases: methane (CH4), nitrous ox-
ide (N2O), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)”). 
                                                                                                                             
2  Throughout the remainder of this brief, we use the abbreviations 
“GHG” to refer to greenhouse gases and “CAA” to refer to the 





EPA rested its decision not to regulate GHGs on a num-
ber of considerations. First, the agency stated that, “[b]ased 
on a thorough review of the CAA, its legislative history, 
other congressional action and Supreme Court precedent, 
EPA believes that the CAA does not authorize regulation to 
address global climate change.” Pet. App. A67 (footnote 
omitted); see also id. at A68-A78. EPA also concluded that, 
even if it was authorized to regulate carbon dioxide under the 
CAA, “Congress has not authorized the Agency to regulate 
CO2 emissions from motor vehicles to the extent such stan-
dards would effectively regulate car and light truck fuel 
economy, which is governed by a comprehensive statute ad-
ministered by DOT.” Id. at A67; see also id. at A77, A79-
A80. 
EPA also cited a number of policy considerations that 
counseled against the regulatory action sought by the peti-
tioners. Specifically, EPA referred to the potential for con-
flict with existing White House policies and initiatives (Pet. 
App. A67-A68), as well as concerns about the foreign policy 
implications of the regulation. Id. at A68; see also id. at A85-
A87.  
In addition EPA stated that, even if the Administrator 
were to “find that GHGs, in general, may reasonably be an-
ticipated to endanger public health or welfare” (Pet. App. 
A81), the agency would have the discretion not to regulate. 
EPA stated that “[d]epending on the particular problem, mo-
tor vehicles may contribute more or less or not at all. An im-
portant issue before the Administrator is whether, given mo-
tor vehicles’ relative contribution to a problem, it makes 
sense to regulate them. * * * The discretionary nature of the 
Administrator’s section 202(a)(1) authority allows her to 
consider these important policy issues and decide to regulate 
motor vehicle emissions as appropriate to the air pollution 
problem being addressed.” Ibid. (emphasis added). EPA con-
cluded that “[w]e do not believe * * * that it would be either 





for motor vehicles at this time” (id. at A82), noting, among 
other things, that establishing GHG emission standards for 
U.S. motor vehicles would “result in an inefficient, piece-
meal approach to addressing the climate change issue.” Id. at 
A85. 
It is this policy judgment that we address in this brief. In 
doing so, we offer our perspective as economists, focusing on 
whether, when considered through the prism of basic eco-
nomic principles, it makes sense to regulate GHGs – particu-
larly carbon dioxide – under Section 202(a) of the CAA.
3 We 
conclude that the regulatory proposals made by the petition-
ers before EPA are likely to have significant adverse impacts 
and that there are alternative regulatory mechanisms for re-
ducing carbon dioxide emissions that are likely to be much 
more cost-effective than the regulatory mechanisms provided 
by Section 202(a).
4 
The petitioners before EPA requested that carbon diox-
ide emissions from motor vehicles be regulated through per-
formance standards involving either Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (“CAFE”) regulations or a zero-emission-vehicle 
                                                                                                                             
3   Our focus on carbon dioxide mirrors the overriding focus on 
carbon dioxide in the petition itself – a focus discerned by the 
court of appeals. See Pet. App. A11 n.2 (“[t]he rulemaking request 
and the papers submitted to this court focus on the effects of 
CO2”). As EPA observed in its decision document, although the 
petitioners suggested a number of ways of reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions, “[p]etitioners do not, however, address the potential for 
reducing motor vehicle emissions of the other three [greenhouse 
gases].” Pet. App. A62; see also Pet. App. A87 (“With respect to 
the other GHGs – CH4, N2O, and HFCs – petitioners make no sug-
gestion as to how these emissions might be reduced from motor 
vehicles”). 
4  A policy is said to be more “cost-effective” than another if it can 
achieve the same overall goal, such as a specified reduction in pol-
lution, at a lower cost. See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 






5 In response to the petitioners’ position 
before EPA, we first discuss the problems inherent in at-
tempts to address a global commons issue like greenhouse 
warming by regulating locally on an individual sector basis. 
Next, we discuss the adverse consequences that would result 
from CAFE regulations and ZEV requirements, which, as 
noted above, are the principal regulatory actions sought by 
petitioners before EPA. Finally, we discuss the widespread 
preference among economists for regulatory mechanisms that 
are more cost-effective and that provide more flexibility than 
standard-setting regulations, such as those proposed by the 
petitioners before EPA.  
Our conclusion is that regulation of carbon dioxide un-
der Section 202(a) is likely to bring with it a number of ad-
verse consequences. This does not mean that policies to con-
trol greenhouse gases should be rejected out of hand. Rather, 
our view is that the use of the regulatory mechanisms af-
forded by Section 202(a) is insupportable and that there are 
other more cost-effective policy options for addressing 
GHGs that should be considered instead. In particular, 
economists generally consider incentive-based mechanisms, 
such as carbon taxes or marketable permits for carbon reduc-
tion, to be much more likely to yield net benefits than would 
performance-based standards, such as those proposed by peti-
tioners before the agency. Accordingly, EPA’s decision not 
to regulate under Section 202(a) was reasonable.    
                                                                                                                             
5  That CAFE and ZEV regulation were the principal regulatory 
options proposed by petitioners is clear from the petition for rule-
making. See JA 36-38, 39-41. EPA recognized this, as well. See 
Pet. App. A87.  EPA noted that petitioners also proposed “tire effi-
ciency standards,” but dismissed such a suggestion as irrelevant to 
the setting of “‘standards applicable to the emission’ of an air pol-
lutant from a motor vehicle under section 202(a)(1).” Ibid. (quot-






We begin with some basic principles to which econo-
mists generally subscribe. First, other things being equal, 
economic principles favor the choice of regulatory options 
that are more cost-effective than alternative regulatory op-
tions. Economists also recognize that regulatory policies that 
provide regulated entities with flexibility in choosing ways to 
meet regulatory goals are likely to yield higher net benefits 
than policies that do not afford flexibility to the regulated en-
tities. Flexibility in regulatory schemes allows regulated enti-
ties to tailor their compliance efforts to their particular cir-
cumstances, enhancing the likelihood that they will choose 
cost-effective methods of compliance, as well as facilitating 
innovation. 
I.  GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS ARE A 
GLOBAL PROBLEM THAT DOES NOT LEND 
ITSELF TO LOCAL, SINGLE-SECTOR SOLU-
TIONS.  
The abatement of greenhouse gases presents a classic 
“tragedy-of-the-commons” problem. See Garrett Hardin, The 
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). In the 
tragedy-of-the-commons, individual members of a commu-
nity make excessive use of a common area because they do 
not take into account the costs that their individual uses im-
pose on others. As Hardin described it: 
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that 
each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as 
possible on the commons. * * *  
  As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to 
maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or 
less consciously, he asks “What is the utility to me 
of adding one more animal to my herd?” This utility 
has one negative and one positive component. 
  (1) The positive component is a function of the 





ceives all the proceeds from the sale of the addi-
tional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1. 
  (2) The negative component is a function of the 
additional overgrazing created by one more animal. 
Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are 
shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for 
any particular decision-making herdsman is only a 
fraction of -1.  
  Adding together the component partial utilities, 
the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensi-
ble course for him to pursue is to add another animal 
to his herd. And another; and another. . . . But this is 
the conclusion reached by each and every rational 
herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the trag-
edy. Each man is locked into a system that compels 
him to increase his herd without limit – in a world 
that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which 
all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in 
a society that believes in the freedom of the com-
mons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. 
Id. at 1244.  
The case of GHG emissions presents a tragedy-of-the-
commons if individuals and firms are not appropriately 
charged the full social cost that their emissions imposes on 
others. Appropriate charges for GHG-emissions, and subsi-
dies for actions that reduce such emissions, can help achieve 
the economically efficient level of GHGs – that is, the level 
at which the marginal benefit of reducing an additional in-
crement of GHG emissions just equals the marginal cost of 
reducing that increment.  
Like other tragedy-of-the-commons problems, GHG 
emissions are not efficiently solved in a piecemeal fashion. In 
denying the rulemaking petition, EPA properly recognized 
that an efficient solution to a GHG emissions problem must 





just the United States, and must not be confined to a single 
sector. Pet. App. A71-A74, A82, A85-A86.  
A brief review of worldwide GHG production shows the 
logic in the EPA’s decision. In 2004, the United States pro-
duced 21.9 percent of estimated worldwide manmade carbon 
dioxide emissions.
6 China produced 17.4 percent and Russia 
produced 6.2 percent.
7 Although the United States is cur-
rently the largest producer worldwide of GHG, that status 
will soon change. If current trends hold, China will be the 
largest producer of GHGs by the year 2015.
8  
Furthermore, GHG production is not limited to an indi-
vidual sector of an economy. In particular, transportation 
produced only 26.8 percent of U.S. GHG emissions in 2002.
9 
Transportation was not even the sector that contributed the 
most to GHG emissions in 2002. The most significant con-
tributor to GHG emissions in 2002 was electricity generation, 
which was responsible for 33 percent of emissions.
10 More-
over, the carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels that were 
not produced by transport vehicles contributed to 49.4 per-
cent of US GHG emissions.
11 By comparison, carbon dioxide 
                                                                                                                             
6  ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INT’L ENERGY ANNUAL (2004), http:// 
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/iea/carbon.html, Table H.1co2 (“World 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Consumption and Flaring of 
Fossil Fuels (Million Metric Tons of Carbon Dioxide), 1980-
2004”). 
7  Ibid.  
8  See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., PROJECTED INT’L CARBON DIOX-
IDE EMISSIONS FROM ENERGY USE TO 2030 (REFERENCE CASE) 
(2006), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/ieoreftab_10.pdf. 
9  U.S. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS & 
SINKS: 1990-2002 (2004) table 2-6, at 2-8 to 2-9, http://yosemite. 
epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/ResourceCenterPublication
sGHGEmissionsUSEmissionsInventory2004.html. 
10  Ibid.  





emissions from fossil fuels from the transportation sector 
produced 25.4 percent.
12  
Consequently, because the emission of GHGs is not only 
a multi-country problem but also a multi-sector problem, it 
was reasonable for EPA to decline to address the issue 
through the tailpipe emission standards sought by petitioners 
before the agency. 
II.  CONTROLLING CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS 
THROUGH CAFE STANDARDS OR ZERO-
EMISSION-VEHICLE MANDATES WOULD 
PRODUCE A HOST OF ADVERSE CONSE-
QUENCES. 
As noted above (page 6, note 5, supra), petitioners be-
fore the EPA focused their arguments on regulation to con-
trol carbon dioxide emissions, and urged the use of CAFE 
standards and ZEV mandates to control such emissions.
13   
Both of these approaches present a myriad of economic 
problems, including serious adverse consequences. 
A.  The Use Of CAFE Standards Would Produce 
Several Adverse Consequences. 
In the denial of the petition for rulemaking, EPA ob-
served that “the only practical way to reduce tailpipe emis-
sions of CO2 is to improve fuel economy.” Pet. App. A79.  
                                                                                                                             
12  Ibid. 
13  The petitioners before EPA also urged the agency to take steps 
to encourage the “market penetration” of hybrid vehicles – that is, 
vehicles “combining a gasoline-powered engine and a battery-
powered electric motor.” JA 38, 39. The only method that the peti-
tioners proposed for enhancing the “market penetration” of hy-
brids, however, was the “setting of new § 202-based CAFE stan-
dards by the EPA.” Id. at 39. Thus, the concerns that we raise in 
subsection A, infra, about the adverse consequences of new CAFE 
standards also apply to the petitioners’ proposal that EPA take 





Therefore, the regulation of carbon dioxide emissions would, 
in all probability, involve new CAFE standards.  
Existing “CAFE” standards are set forth under the fed-
eral motor vehicle fuel economy program authorized under 
Title III of the Energy Policy Conservation Act (“EPCA”), 
Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871, 901, et seq. (1975) (now 
codified at 49 U.S.C. § 32901, et seq.). The program is ad-
ministered by the National Highway Traffic Safety Admini-
stration (“NHTSA”), a unit of the United States Department 
of Transportation. NHTSA has administered CAFE standards 
under the program for light duty motor vehicles for more 
than two decades. These CAFE standards establish average 
fuel economy levels that must be met by each vehicle manu-
facturer’s fleet. The average fuel economy for each fleet is 
calculated under “testing and calculation procedures pre-
scribed by the Administrator” of EPA. 49 U.S.C. § 32904(c). 
EPA’s procedures call for measuring certain exhaust emis-
sions, including carbon dioxide. The carbon dioxide emis-
sions are measured in terms of grams of carbon dioxide per 
mile, and then converted into miles per gallon, according to a 
formula in EPA’s regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 600.113-93(e). 
With this information, EPA computes each manufacturer’s 
fleet average fuel economy in miles per gallon, and reports 
the results to NHTSA. 49 U.S.C. § 32904(e). 
CAFE standards create a host of well-documented ad-
verse consequences. One such consequence is known as the 
rebound effect. The rebound effect states that, by reducing 
driving costs, fuel economy standards actually encourage 
more driving and thereby increase congestion, pollution, and 
traffic accidents.
14 Such additional driving also would likely 
increase the emissions of GHGs.  
                                                                                                                             
14  See, e.g., David L. Greene, Vehicle Use and Fuel Economy: 
How Big is the “Rebound” Effect?, 13 ENERGY J. 117, 118 (1992); 
David L. Greene, James R. Kahn & Robert C. Gibson, Fuel Econ-
omy Rebound Effect for U.S. Household Vehicles, 20 ENERGY J. 1, 






The size of the rebound effect is considerable. Econo-
mists have estimated that the rebound effect is large enough 
to undermine the effectiveness of CAFE standards by be-
tween 10 and 30 percent.
15 That is, a 100 percent improve-
ment in the fuel economy of the vehicle fleet would result in 
a 10 to 30 percent “rebound” in the form of additional miles 
driven. When added to the additional damage of increased 
congestion and traffic accidents, it is clear that the goal of 
CAFE standards is significantly undermined by the existence 
of the rebound effect. 
Another adverse consequence of CAFE standards is the 
fact that they increase the cost of new vehicles. This, in turn, 
provides incentives for individuals to delay the purchase of 
new vehicles and continue driving their older vehicles, which 
could have adverse economic consequences for various parts 
of the automobile sector. Moreover, any delay in purchasing 
new vehicles also delays the achievement of the environ-
mental benefits associated with newer vehicles that are pro-
duced with new technologies that decrease emissions.
16 
Therefore, CAFE standards can actually increase the level of 
emissions produced by vehicles, particularly in the short-
run.
17 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
hicle Use and the ‘Rebound Effect’ from Improved Fuel Efficiency, 
14 ENERGY J. 99, 99 (1993) (discussing that the rebound effect re-
sults in an increase in vehicle miles traveled). 
15   Lorna A. Greening, David L. Greene & Carmen Difiglio, En-
ergy Efficiency and Consumption—the Rebound Effect—a Survey, 
28 ENERGY POL’Y 389, 398 (2000) (table 3).  
16  See,  e.g., Howard K. Gruenspecht, Differentiated Regulation: 
The Case of Auto Emissions Standards, 72 AM. ECON. REV. PA-
PERS  &  PROC. 328, 330-331 (1982); ROBERT  W.  CRANDALL, 
HOWARD K. GRUENSPECHT, THEODORE E. KEELER & LESTER B. 
LAVE, REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE 89-90 (1986). 
17  See, e.g., Gruenspecht, Differentiated Regulation, supra note 16, 
at 331 (more stringent emissions standards for CO, NOx, and HC 






Still another potential consequence of CAFE standards is 
their effect on vehicle safety, although this effect is still con-
tested. Economists have argued that one approach that vehi-
cle manufacturers can use to meet CAFE standards is a re-
duction in the weight of the vehicles they produce.
18 Lighter 
vehicles, on average, are linked with greater instances of in-
jury or death when vehicle accidents occur.
19 Opponents of 
this argument, however, state that it is unclear whether the 
majority of vehicle weight reductions from CAFE standards 
result in a conversion from mid-sized cars to small cars 
(which could increase fatalities) or cause manufacturers to 
limit the production of their largest cars and light trucks 
(which could actually improve overall vehicle safety).
20 
Nevertheless, it is clear that CAFE-like standards pose a 
great risk of producing detrimental consequences. Thus, EPA 
would be entirely justified in refusing the petitioners’ request 
to promulgate them as a means of restricting the emission of 
carbon dioxide from motor vehicles. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
emissions in certain areas); Robert N. Stavins, Vintage-
Differentiated Environmental Regulation, 25 STAN.  ENVTL.  L.J. 
29, 48-49 (2006) (regulations that impose standards for new auto-
mobiles depress sales and have “extended the useful lives of cars 
on the road, and therefore can increase aggregate emissions,” 
thereby compromising the cost-effectiveness of such regulations; 
therefore, “alternative regulatory approaches merit ongoing explo-
ration”).  
18 Robert W. Crandall & John D. Graham, The Effect of Fuel 
Economy Standards on Automobile Safety, 32 J.L. & ECON. 97, 97 
(1989). 
19  Id. at 98.  
20    Paul R. Portney, Ian W.H. Parry, Howard K. Gruenspecht & 
Winston Harrington, The Economics of Fuel Economy Standards, 





B.  Zero-Emission-Vehicle Requirements Also 
Would Produce Adverse Consequences 
A ZEV-mandate also would produce a number of ad-
verse consequences, the most problematic of which would be 
likely net increases in the emissions of non-GHG pollutants. 
In fact, the category “zero emissions vehicle” is a misnomer: 
ZEVs do produce emissions, just not from the tailpipe. Thus, 
electric cars – the only ZEV yet to be produced on any wide-
scale basis – produce significant amounts of pollutants result-
ing from the production of electricity, because their batteries 
must be recharged.
21 Once an electric car’s battery is drained, 
the car requires significant quantities of electricity before it 
can be driven, and that electricity is generally produced by a 
fossil fuel or nuclear generation unit.
22 In addition, the lead-
acid batteries used in ZEVs pose risks of increased emissions 
of lead and other toxic metals and will require the processing 
and recycling of many times more lead than is found in con-
ventional vehicles.
23  
In addition to the increased non-GHG pollutants associ-
ated with ZEVs, a ZEV mandate also would provide great in-
centive for consumers to retain their older combustion engine 
vehicles for longer periods of time. When estimating the ef-
fect on net pollution from California’s mandate for the sale of 
ZEVs, Howard Gruenspecht found that California’s ZEV 
mandate would substantially increase vehicle emissions of 
reactive organic gases and nitrogen oxides, on net.
24 In par-
ticular, he found that the increase in such emissions from the 
                                                                                                                             
21  GAO, Electric Vehicles: Likely Consequences of U.S. and Other 
Nations’ Programs and Policies, PEMD-95-7, Dec. 30, 1994, at 
111. 
22  Ibid.  
23  Cf. Howard Gruenspecht, Zero Emission Vehicles: A Dirty Little 
Secret, RESOURCES, Winter 2001, at 7, available at http://rff.org/ 
rff/Publications/Resource_Articles.cfm. 





increase in the retention of existing vehicles would be be-
tween 3 and 15 times greater than the decrease in emissions 
enjoyed from ZEVs.
25 
In summary, a ZEV mandate also would produce signifi-
cant adverse consequences. Thus, EPA’s policy judgment not 
to promulgate such a mandate was a reasonable exercise of 
the agency’s discretion. 
III. THE STANDARD-SETTING REGULATIONS 
PROPOSED BY PETITIONERS BEFORE EPA 
WOULD YIELD LOWER NET BENEFITS THAN 
OTHER REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES. 
The petition for rulemaking sought regulation under Sec-
tion 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, which requires EPA in 
specified circumstances to regulate by setting “standards” for 
emissions of pollutants from new motor vehicles. See Peti-
tion for Rulemaking, JA 5, 6-7, 15, 16, 21-44; see also Pet. 
Br. 3 (“In 1999, the International Center for Technology As-
sessment and other parties petitioned EPA to set standards 
for four chemicals emitted by new motor vehicles: carbon di-
oxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons”).  
As this Court has recognized, under Title II of the CAA, 
which includes Section 202(a), “standards” refers to “re-
quirements such as numerical emission levels with which ve-
hicles or engines must comply, or emission-control technol-
ogy with which they must be equipped.” Engine Mfrs. Ass’n 
v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 253 
(2004) (citations omitted; citing subsections 202(a)(3)(B)(ii) 
and 202(a)(6)).   
As noted above, the petitioners before EPA primarily 
sought standards-setting regulations in the form of CAFE re-
quirements or a ZEV mandate. See page 6, note 5, supra. The 
CAFE and ZEV mandates proposed by the petitioners before 
EPA would involve the imposition of performance standards. 
                                                                                                                             





In general, regulation through performance standards is pref-
erable to regulation by means of design standards.
26 See, e.g., 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT 270 (2002) (“A ‘performance standard,’ 
telling people (for example) to reduce sulfur dioxide emis-
sions to a certain level, is better than a technology require-
ment [i.e., design standard] simply because it is more flexible 
and allows companies to meet the standard as they choose”).  
Nevertheless, despite the general superiority of perform-
ance standards to design standards, there can be still more 
cost-effective ways to regulate, depending on the circum-
stances. For instance, a carbon tax or marketable permits for 
carbon reduction both are likely to be more cost-effective ap-
proaches to controlling carbon dioxide emissions than would 
CAFE regulations or a ZEV mandate. As Professor Sunstein 
notes in connection with the use of tax schemes for regulat-
ing pollutants,  
[b]ut much of the time, a still better approach [than 
performance standards] is to impose a tax on harm-
ful behavior and to let market forces determine the 
response to the increased cost. In many settings, the 
best approach is for government to impose fees on 
those who put pollutants into the atmosphere. Con-
sumption of the harm-producing good will decline. 
People will, for example, be less likely to use high-
polluting gasoline; emissions of carbon dioxide, the 
leading contributor to global warming, will decline. 
 
                                                                                                                             
26   For the distinction between performance standards and design 
standards in the context of motor vehicle regulation, see DePaepe 
v. General Motors Corp., 141 F.3d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 1998) (“De-
sign standards specify what a component of a vehicle must be; per-
formance standards specify what the component must accom-





SUNSTEIN, RISK & REASON, supra, at 270.
27 
The use of alternative incentive-based regulatory ap-
proaches would afford regulated entities greater flexibility 
than would the performance standards advocated by the peti-
tioners before EPA. Such approaches would be likely to yield 
higher net benefits than would CAFE regulations or a ZEV 
mandate.  For example, these alternative approaches could be 
more cost-effective than CAFE regulations or a ZEV man-
date by achieving the same overall level of emissions reduc-
tions for carbon dioxide at a lower cost.  In these circum-
stances, EPA’s rejection of the petition seeking to force it to 
impose CAFE or ZEV regulation was not arbitrary or capri-
cious but perfectly reasonable.
28  
                                                                                                                             
27  See also William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Ex-
ternalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 319 (1972) (a system based on 
specified standards for pollutants and taxes on emissions would 
“avoid[] direct controls with all of their heavy administrative costs 
and their distortions of consumer choice and inefficiencies”; 
“unlike any system of direct controls, it promises, at least in prin-
ciple, to achieve decreases in pollution or other types of damage to 
the environment at minimum cost to society”); Warwick J. 
McKibbin & Peter J. Wilcoxen, The Role of Economics in Climate 
Change Policy, 16 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 107, 107 (2002) (“hy-
brid policy, combining the best features of” a tradable permit sys-
tem and an emissions tax “would be an efficient and practical ap-
proach” to climate change regulation). For a discussion of eco-
nomically efficient climate change policies in a global context, see 
WILLIAM  D.  NORDHAUS  &  JOSEPH  BOYER,  WARMING THE 
WORLD:  ECONOMIC  MODELS OF GLOBAL  WARMING  121-144 
(2000). 
28  See, e.g., Andrew W. Kleit, Impacts of Long-Range Increases in 
the Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standard, 42 ECON. INQUIRY 279, 293 
(2004) (“increases in CAFE standards above current levels are nei-
ther cost-effective nor cost-beneficial” and would amount to “12 
times the cost of a gasoline tax increase that would save the same 
amount of fuel”); cf. McKibbin & Wilcoxen, supra note 27, at 127 
(criticizing as “deeply flawed” policies that set “rigid targets and 






*  *  *  *  * 
In sum, EPA acted reasonably in rejecting the petition-
ers’ request for CAFE regulations or a ZEV mandate to ad-
dress emissions of carbon dioxide from motor vehicles. The 
emission of GHGs is not only a multi-country problem but 
also a multi-sector problem. In addition, the regulations 
sought by the petitioners before EPA could produce a num-
ber of adverse consequences. Incentive-based mechanisms, 
such as carbon taxes or marketable permits, would likely be 
more cost-effective than CAFE regulations or a ZEV man-
date, and merit further consideration. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the court of appeals should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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flexible approach, such as one that combines tradable permits with 
an emissions tax). 